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Date: April 29, 2024 Mon
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Results for prison contraband
17 results foundAuthor: Chambers, Max Title: Coming Clean: Combating Drug Misuse in Prisons Summary: This report aaserts that U.K. prisons, traditionally thought of as secure institutions, are awash with drugs. The easy availability of drugs in prisons undermines treatment programs, allows prisoners to maintain anti-social habits during their sentence, and leaves them unprepared for release and primed to reoffend. While is less widely known is how drugs really get in to prisons, and what really goes on inside prisons in an effort to get inmates off drugs and prepared for release. Following extensive consultation with senior figures involved in tackling the problem of drug misuse in prisons, this report outlines a series of recommendations which would make a real difference in helping prisoners to get off - and stay off - illegal drugs. Details: London: Policy Exchange, 2010. 43p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2010 Country: United Kingdom URL: Shelf Number: 119281 Keywords: Drug Smuggling, PrisonsDrugsInmates, Use of DrugsPrison ContrabandPrisonersPrisons |
Author: Victoria. Ombudsman Title: Whistleblowers Protection Act 2001: Investigation into Conditions at the Melbourne Youth Justice Precinct Summary: This report investigates the Melbourne Youth Justice Centre and the Melbourne Youth Residential Centre at Parkville that draws conclusions about: unacceptable conditions; improper conduct; inadequate quality of care; and non‐compliance with operational and legislative provisions, including human rights responsibilities and working with children checks. The report makes 27 recommendations, all of which have been accepted by the Department of Human Services. Details: Melbourne: Victorian Government Printer, 2010. 97p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 14, 2010 at: http://www.ombudsman.vic.gov.au/resources/documents/Investigation_into_conditions_at_the_Melbourne_Youth_Justice_Precinct_Oct_20101.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Australia URL: http://www.ombudsman.vic.gov.au/resources/documents/Investigation_into_conditions_at_the_Melbourne_Youth_Justice_Precinct_Oct_20101.pdf Shelf Number: 119961 Keywords: Corrections OfficersJuvenile CorrectionsJuvenile Detention FacilitiesPrison AdministrationPrison ConditionsPrison Contraband |
Author: Independent Commission Against Corruption Title: Report on Investigation Into the Introduction of Contraband Into the Metropolitan Remand and Reception Centre, Silverwater Summary: This report deals with an investigation by the Independent Commission Against Corruption (the Commission) concerning the introduction of contraband into the Metropolitan Remand and Reception Centre (MRRC) located at the Silverwater Correctional Complex. The MRRC can accommodate approximately 900 inmates, most of whom are on remand (i.e. not yet sentenced). On 25 August 2003 the Department of Corrective Services (DCS) informed the Commission of allegations that a custodial officer employed at the MRRC was taking contraband into the gaol. Initial enquiries by the Commission confirmed that the officer was Shayne Alan Hughes, then a Correctional Officer First Class. The Commission conducted an investigation which focussed on the conduct of Mr Hughes in relation to the introduction of contraband into the MRRC. On 11 December 2003 Commission officers met with police officers attached to the Corrective Services Investigation Unit (CSIU) and advised them that Mr Hughes was likely to attempt to bring contraband into the MRRC on the following day. Mr Hughes was apprehended after he had entered the MRRC and was searched. A quantity of steroid tablets and a mobile telephone were found hidden in his underpants. Hughes was interviewed by CSIU officers and then by Commission officers. He denied receiving any financial benefit for taking contraband into the gaol apart from free entry into nightclubs and drugs. In hearings before the Commission, Mr Hughes admitted taking mobile telephones and drugs into the MRRC and also made admissions concerning his involvement in other criminal activity, some of which had arisen from his association with a particular inmate. He also admitted receiving cash payments relating to these activities, including the sum of $1,000 on the day before he was apprehended. Findings are made in Chapter 5 of this report that Mr Hughes had dealings with an inmate and his family between April 2003 and December 2003 and took a considerable amount of contraband into the MRRC over that period, for which he received the sum of $5,000. Findings are also made that he received an additional sum of $1,000 on 11 December 2003 in return for taking contraband into the MRRC and that he attempted to take the contraband into the Centre on 12 December 2003. These findings of fact have been used as the basis for findings of corrupt conduct. Mr Hughes was charged on 12 December 2003 with three offences under the Summary Offences Act 1988 in relation to taking contraband into the gaol and with the unlawful possession of a prescribed substance (the steroids). After further enquiries he was also charged with corruptly receiving a benefit of $1,000 on 11 December 2003 contrary to section 249B(1) of the Crimes Act 1900. He has since pleaded guilty to those charges and is currently serving a term of imprisonment.A number of recommendations are made in Chapter 6 of this report to assist DCS to improve the effectiveness of procedures designed to minimise the entry of contraband into correctional centres. Details: Sydney: Independent Commission Against Corruption, 2004. 35p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 9, 2010 at: http://www.icac.nsw.gov.au/publications-and-resources/investigations-publications Year: 2004 Country: Australia URL: http://www.icac.nsw.gov.au/publications-and-resources/investigations-publications Shelf Number: 120423 Keywords: Corrections OfficersCorruptionPrison Contraband |
Author: U.S. Department of Commerce Title: Contraband Cell Phones in Prisons: Possible Wireless Technology Solutions Summary: The National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) submits this report in response to a direction from Congress in December 2009 that NTIA, in coordination with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), and the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), develop a plan to investigate and evaluate wireless jamming, detection, and other technologies that might be used to prevent contraband cell phone use by prison inmates. NTIA has identified and evaluated several technology solutions for this report that can be used in a prison environment, including jamming, managed access, and detection techniques. In the preparation of this report, NTIA sought input from the FCC, NIJ, and BOP regarding their efforts to combat contraband cell phone use. The Administration believes that contraband cell phone use by prison inmates to carry out criminal enterprises is intolerable and demands an effective solution. Prison officials should have access to technology to disrupt prison cell phone use in a manner that protects nearby public safety and Federal Government spectrum users from harmful disruption of vital services, and preserves the rights of law-abiding citizens to enjoy the benefits of the public airwaves without interference. To obtain public input on these issues to assist in developing this report, NTIA issued a Notice of Inquiry (NOI) in May 2010 soliciting comment on a series of detailed questions to help identify, clarify, and characterize these solutions. NTIA received comments from forty-six sources. In addition to providing input regarding the three technologies identified in the NOI, commenters identified additional technologies for consideration. Working in coordination with its Institute for Telecommunication Sciences, NTIA performed both laboratory and field measurements on a selected jammer. NTIA subsequently analyzed the results of those measurements to determine, as far as possible, the potential impact of that jammer on other authorized radio operations. This report discusses the characteristics and capabilities of the various technologies and considers the potential interference effects that they may have on authorized radio services, including commercial wireless, public safety communications, and 9-1-1 calls. Three possible wireless technology solutions were identified in the NOI that commenters further expounded upon: jamming, managed access, and detection. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Commerce, 2010. 58p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 16, 2011 at: http://www.ntia.doc.gov/reports/2010/ContrabandCellPhoneReport_December2010.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.ntia.doc.gov/reports/2010/ContrabandCellPhoneReport_December2010.pdf Shelf Number: 121018 Keywords: Cell PhonesPrison Contraband |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Bureau of Prisons: Improved Evaluations and Increased Coordination Could Improve Cell Phone Detection Summary: BOP's rates for inmate telephone calls typically are lower than selected state and military branch systems that also use telephone revenues to support inmate activities; lowering rates would have several implications. Inmates would benefit from the ability to make cheaper phone calls, but lower rates could result in less revenue and lower profits, and therefore fewer funds available for inmate wages and recreational activities. According to BOP officials, when inmates have fewer opportunities for physical activity, idleness increases, and the risk of violence, escapes, and other disruptions also rises. BOP and selected states confiscated thousands of cell phones in 2010, and these entities believe that rising inmate cell phone use threatens institutional safety and expands criminal activity. All of the BOP officials, as well as officials from all eight of the state departments of correction with whom GAO spoke, cited cell phones as a major security concern, given the potential the phones provide for inmates to have unmonitored conversations that could further criminal activity, such as selling drugs or harassing other individuals. BOP and selected states have taken actions to address contraband cell phone use in their correctional institutions, but BOP could better evaluate existing technologies to maximize its investment decisions. BOP screens visitors and staff to detect contraband and has also tested multiple cell-phone detection technologies. However, BOP has not developed evaluation plans for institutional use to measure the effectiveness of these tests, which could help ensure that such tests generate information needed to make effective policy decisions. Moreover, while BOP has shared detection strategies with state agencies to some extent, BOP's regional offices have only had limited interaction with states, and could increase coordination and knowledge sharing to better identify and benefit from other strategies being used. This is a public version of a sensitive but unclassified - law enforcement sensitive report that GAO issued in July 2011. Information that the Department of Justice deemed sensitive has been omitted. GAO recommends that BOP's Director formulate evaluation plans for cell phone detection technology to aid decision making, require use of these plans, and enhance regional collaboration with states. The Department of Justice concurred with GAO's recommendations. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2011. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-11-893: Accessed September 7, 2011 at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11893.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11893.pdf Shelf Number: 122673 Keywords: Cellular TelephonesCorrectional FacilitiesPrison ContrabandPrison SecurityPrisonersRisk ManagementSmuggling |
Author: California. Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. Office of Inspector General Title: Special Report: Inmate Cell Phone Use Endangers Prison Security and Public Safety Summary: According to numerous California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (Department) officials, the possession of cell phones and electronic communication devices by California’s inmates is one of the most significant problems facing the Department today. Therefore, in February 2009, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) began a review into the proliferation of contraband cell phones in California prisons and how their use puts Department staff, inmates, and the general public at risk. During 2006, correctional officers seized approximately 261 cell phones in the state’s prisons and camps. However, by 2008, that number increased ten-fold to 2,811 with no end in sight. Inmates’ access to cell phone technology facilitates their ability to communicate amongst themselves and their associates outside of prison, to plan prison assaults, plot prison escapes, and orchestrate a myriad of other illegal activity. In addition, these devices can provide an inmate unrestricted and unmonitored access to the Internet, whereby they can communicate with unsuspecting victims, including minors. According to the Department, inmates are paying those involved in smuggling cell phones into California prisons between $500 and $1,000 per phone. There are currently no criminal consequences for the introduction or possession of cell phones in prison, making this activity merely an administrative violation. Furthermore, current security entrance procedures provide ample opportunities for staff and visitors to bring contraband into prison facilities without fear of discovery. Therefore, the introduction of cell phones into state prisons is a low risk, high reward endeavor. In addition to staff, other conduits for smuggling cell phones include visitors, outside accomplices, minimum support facility inmates working outside perimeter fences, and contracted employees. In an effort to combat this growing threat, the Department is supporting legislation making it a crime to introduce or possess cell phones in California’s prisons. Unfortunately, previous efforts to pass similar legislation have failed. In addition, technology that detects or jams cell phone signals is commercially available but potentially expensive and would require federal authorization to place into use. Other detection methods that have been used or are now in sporadic use, such as hands-on searches, metal detectors, and x-ray equipment, are more labor intensive and would require an increase in staffing and funding. Details: Sacramento: Office of the Inspector General, 2009. 18p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 17, 2012 at: http://www.oig.ca.gov/media/reports/BOI/Special%20Report%20of%20Inmate%20Cell%20Phone%20Use.pdf Year: 2009 Country: United States URL: http://www.oig.ca.gov/media/reports/BOI/Special%20Report%20of%20Inmate%20Cell%20Phone%20Use.pdf Shelf Number: 125321 Keywords: Cell PhonesInmatesPrison ContrabandPrisonersPrisons (California) |
Author: Great Britain. Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Prisons Title: Changing patterns of substance misuse in adult prisons and service responses Summary: Drug misuse is a serious threat to the security of the prison system, the health of individual prisoners and the safety of prisoners and staff. Its effects ripple outwards to harm prisoners' friends and families and the wider community of which they are a part. An increasing number of reports of the misuse of medication in prison and concerns that traditional supply reduction and treatment strategies were ineffective were the initial driver for this thematic inspection. However, the availability of new psychoactive substances (NPS), particularly synthetic cannabis known as 'Spice' or 'Mamba', became highly prevalent during the preparation for this report. NPS have created significant additional harm and are now the most serious threat to the safety and security of the prison system that our inspections identify. This thematic inspection examined the changing extent and patterns of drug misuse in adult prisons and assessed the effectiveness of the response to it. The inspection's remit did not include tobacco and alcohol use by prisoners, which are important issues in their own right and raise significant operational and policy challenges. Of course, there are wider questions to be asked about the legal status of drugs in the community and the historical inconsistency of legal responses to various harmful substances. This report does not address those issues. There is no prospect of any relaxation of the rules governing the substances that are permitted in prisons and so there is an urgent requirement to address the harm that substance misuse causes in prisons in that realistic context. The report draws on the evidence of 61 adult prison inspections published between April 2014 and August 2015, the 10,702 survey responses from individual prisoners that were collected as part of those inspections, and detailed field work that was conducted in eight prisons between June and November 2014. We spoke to prisoners, prison staff and managers, drugs and health workers, and other experts. We reviewed a wide range of research undertaken by other bodies. We also considered some earlier inspection findings, where relevant. The inspection was carried out by the inspectorate's research team and specialist health and drugs inspectors. Changing patterns of drug use in the community provide a useful context for understanding drug misuse in prisons. It is impossible to know for certain the extent and type of drug misuse in the community or in prisons. Nevertheless, there is a wealth of evidence to suggest that patterns of drug use are changing in the community, with drug use appearing to be reducing. The 2014-15 Crime Survey for England and Wales found that 8-9% of adults reported illicit drug use over the previous year, down from 12% in 2003-04. Cannabis remains the most widely used drug and there has been a well-evidenced decline in illicit opiate use. The reported use of prescribed medication and NPS in the community is at a relatively low level. Patterns of dug misuse vary with age, gender, geography and lifestyle. There are important differences between drug misuse in prisons and the community. A declining number of prisoners needing treatment for opiate misuse reflects trends in the community, although many of those requiring opiate treatment in prison have complex dependence, social, physical and mental health issues. Prisoners are more likely to use depressants than stimulants to counter the boredom and stress of prison life. The use of synthetic cannabis and diverted medication reflects a response to comparative weaknesses in security measures. Often, the price of drugs is higher and the quality poorer in prison, reflecting greater difficulty of supply. The combination of community influences, prisoner demographics and individual prison contexts means that the patterns of drug use will differ from prison to prison. As this report was being prepared, there was an acceleration in the use and availability of NPS. It is important to understand, however, that success in combating current challenges in prisons, such as the availability of NPS or specific medications, will lead to an increased demand for other drugs, and to be prepared for this. Details: London: HM Inspectorate of Prisons, 2015. 85p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 16, 2016 at: https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmiprisons/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2015/12/Substance-misuse-web-2015.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmiprisons/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2015/12/Substance-misuse-web-2015.pdf Shelf Number: 138694 Keywords: Drug AbuseDrug OffendersPrison ContrabandPrisoner MisconductPrisonersPrisons |
Author: Ochola, Gumbi Vincent Title: The effect of contraband smuggling on rehabilitation of inmates in Kenya: the case of Kamiti maximum prison Summary: The main mission of Kamiti Maximum prison is to rehabilitate its inmates in order to make good citizens once they are out of the facility. Contraband on the other hand finds their way into the prison via different means hence posing a great challenge to the process of rehabilitation. The aim of this study therefore was to find out how the contraband are smuggled into prison, why inmates use contraband and to examine the effect of contraband on inmates‟ rehabilitation. This qualitative research among 36 Prison Officers and 70 inmates examined the effect and use of contraband. It is clear that there are several routes of entry and reasons why inmates use contraband. This study has shown that the most popular routes of entry is through members of staff, during social visits and contraband thrown over perimeter walls of the prison at 25%, 19% and 17% respectively. Majority of inmates (63%) use contraband as a form of currency to make prison life more comfortable and maintain own contraband use. This study also reveals the negative effect associated with contraband use including an increase in insecurity, namely bullying, violence and withdrawal. It is essential that prisons provide adequate detoxification to reduce withdrawal symptoms and alleviate their need to import or purchase illegal drugs. Prisons must increase their efforts to reduce supply. This will reduce opportunistic use, and with it the risk of prisoners developing ‟jail habits‟ in custody. Devising a policy for tackling contraband in prison is prudent for major contribution in reducing criminal behaviour in prison as well as offences outside prisons. Finally it is essential to recognise that increased security has significant effects; it can disorganise and eliminate contraband supply routes. Details: Nairobi City, Kenya: Kenyatta University, 2015. 70p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed September 2, 2016 at: http://ir-library.ku.ac.ke/handle/123456789/13790 Year: 2015 Country: Kenya URL: http://ir-library.ku.ac.ke/handle/123456789/13790 Shelf Number: 140115 Keywords: ContrabandPrison ContrabandPrisoner RehabilitationSmuggling |
Author: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Evaluation and Inspections Division Title: Review of Federal Bureau of Prisons' Contraband Interdiction Efforts Summary: The Federal Bu reau of Prisons (BOP) faces the persistent problem of contraband smuggling. The introduction of contraband can pose grave dangers to BOP staff and the approximately 200,000 federal inmates in BOP custody, as well as to visitors and the public. The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) conducted this review to examine the BOP's security procedures to interdict contraband. We also interviewed representatives from selected state prison systems regard ing their contraband interdiction strategies and staff search policies and procedures. Contraband is defined in 28 C.F.R. SOO.l(h) as prohibited materials "which can reasonably be expected to cause physical injury or adversely affect the security, safety, or good order of the institution." Such items include weapons, drugs, currency, tobacco, telephones, and electronic devices. According to BOP data, cell phones were the most common type of contraband recovered from fiscal years (FY) 2012 through 2014. An inmate with a cell phone, particularly a smartphone, can carry out criminal activities undetected, including threatening and intimidating witnesses, victims, and public officials, and coordinate escape attempts. The BOP reports that over 8,700 cell phones were recovered during this period, 2,012 more than the next most common contraband type, weapons. The data shows that while cell phone recoveries decreased slightly during this period, recoveries of other contraband, such as weapons, narcotics, and tobacco, increased significantly. However, as described below, we have concerns about the completeness of the BOP's data. Results in Brief The BOP Does Not Have a Comprehensive Contraband Tracking Capability We found that the BOP lacks a comprehensive contraband tracking system, and current data collection methods impede its ability to effectively track contraband recoveries and analyze contraband trends. The BOP has taken steps to automate data collection on contraband recoveries, such as by implementing TRUINTEL, a data base for entering information associated with inmate investigations, including contraband recoveries. However, BOP staff told us TRUINTEL was not designed to be a comprehensive contraband tracking system. We found that TRUINTEL does not provide a complete picture of contraband recoveries because certain contraband may not be entered and multiple contraband items may be entered as only one item. We also found that automated log books used to document contraband recovered during unit searches are not linked to TRUINTEL. With regard to cell phones, TRUINTEL does not capture all data available through the other methods the BOP uses to track recovered cell phones, including both the BOP's unit log books and its "Cell Phones Recovered" reports. Unlike TRUINTEL, the "Cell Phones Recovered" reports include all phones confiscated, regard less of whether the phones are attributed to an inmate; however, these reports lack details that make duplicative entries in TRUINTEL unidentifiable. The BOP Did Not Effectively Implement Its 2013 Staff Search Policy to Deter Staff Introduction of Contraband In a January 2003 report, the OIG recommended that the BOP revise its staff search policy to require searches of staff and their property when entering institutions. After more than 10 years of negotiation with its union, the BOP implemented a new staff search policy in 2013. However, in June 2015, just prior to the completion of our fieldwork for this review, the Federal Labor Relations Authority ordered the BOP to cease and desist using the 2013 staff search policy following a union challenge to it. 1 The BOP then reinstated the policy on March 28, 2016 with minor changes not relevant to this review. As a result, more than 13 years after our 2003 report, the BOP still has no comprehensive and effective staff search policy. We found significant deficiencies with the 2013 policy and its implementation. The policy provided that all staff and their belongings could be searched randomly or based on reasonable suspicion when entering, reentering, or inside an institution or on its grounds. However, the policy did not prescribe any required frequency for conducting random pat searches, resulting in what we found to be infrequent staff pat searches of varying duration. It also allowed staff to possess and use within institutions items, such as tobacco, that are prohibited for inmates. Additionally, despite the BOP concurring in 2003 with the OIG's recommendation that it restrict the size and content of personal property that staff may bring into institutions, the 2013 policy contained no such restrictions. The policy further permitted staff to return to their vehicles to store contraband that had been identified during front lobby screening procedures, unless doing so would jeopardize the safety, security, or good order of the institution, or public safety. Finally, the policy did not ensure that only trained and supervised staff was assigned to front lobby positions, and we found that at some institutions entry-level Information Receptionists were assigned to these positions. Our research also indicated that the staff search policies governing state prison systems are often more strict in many of these areas. The safety and security of staff and inmates will continue to be at risk until the BOP develops and implements a comprehensive and effective staff search policy. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2016. 85p. Source: Internet Resource: Evaluation and Inspections Division 16-05: Accessed September 21, 2016 at: https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2016/e1605.pdf#page=1 Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2016/e1605.pdf#page=1 Shelf Number: 145579 Keywords: Contraband GoodFederal Bureau of PrisonsPrison ContrabandSmuggling of Goods |
Author: McBride, George Title: High Stakes: An Inquiry into the Drugs Crisis in English Prisons Summary: Prisons are in crisis with record levels of suicides, violence and self-harm. Traditional drugs have been replaced by a family of drugs called synthetic cannabinoid receptor agonists, generically referred to as 'black mamba' or 'spice.' The government has failed to recognise the important policy implications of these new drugs, and the lack of intelligent drug policy in the new white paper risks undermining the entirety of the proposed prison reforms. This report is the first of its kind bringing together experts in drug and prison policy to examine the implications of the radical shift in prison drug markets and propose pragmatic solutions to reduce drug-related harms and improve prison safety and security. The report reviews the rise to near ubiquity of spice in men's prisons in England. These diverse and multitudinous substances have risen to prominence globally in response to international prohibition of popular illicit substances, in particular cannabis. These new substances have relatively unknown risk profiles and many induce paranoia, behavioural disturbances, violence, seizures and convulsions. They are particularly popular in prisons due to their low cost, difficulty to detect, and "bird [prison sentence] killing" effects. Too little is being done to fight drug demand within prisons. Prisoners are often left unoccupied in their cells for 23 hours a day. Many prisoners are developing drug problems during their incarceration. Overall 8% of men in prison in England and Wales report developing a drug problem since they have been in prison. In prisons with the worst regimes this is as high as 14-16%. This is increasing drug use and the frequency of dangerous incidents, which are a substantial drain on prison staff resources. This feeds a vicious cycle, further draining resources, and is leaving prisoners increasingly unoccupied and under supervised. As staff capacity is reduced this further decreases the ability of prisons to perform essential functions in disrupting the supply of drugs into prisons leaving criminal organisations able to push drugs with impunity. The supply reduction methods proposed in the White Paper are expensive distractions from the real work needed to disrupt criminal supply chains. Proposed extensions to the mandatory drug testing regime will be impracticable with the available resources, only identify a limited range of the drugs in circulation, and fail to assist in identifying those supplying drugs. New sniffer dogs will quickly become obsolete due to the rate of chemical innovation of new substances. We are currently monitoring drug use in prisons through mandatory drug testing and records of seizures. These methods give very little assistance in terms of understanding who is supplying drugs, who is using drugs, what drugs are in circulation, how drugs are getting into prisons, or the level and nature of harm associated with drug use in a given prison. Recommendations: Risk management not zero tolerance – a chasm exists between the prevailing rhetoric and policy reality. In order to manage prisons effectively efforts need to focus on disrupting supply chains, reducing demand for drugs, and improving intelligence-gathering. Reducing drug-related harms makes prisons safer places in which rehabilitation is more effective. Helping addicted drug-users who are willing to change to turn their lives around is proven to reduce re-offending rates. Reduce demand through purposeful activity – There needs to be an acceptance that supply reduction measures are there to disrupt supply, they are not there to eradicate it. A shift of emphasis towards demand reduction is required to make prisons more effective places at tackling problem drug habits and rehabilitating offenders. There is a clear link between a lack of purposeful activity and the uptake of drug use. Busy prison regimes and treatment are more effective than security measures in managing the drug problem in our prisons. The long-held emphasis on supply reduction over demand reduction creates an increased burden on staff, logistical and management difficulties, and associated difficulties in implementing new policies, supporting work, training, education and treatment schemes. These costs too often go uncounted. Overhaul monitoring of drug use – An essential part of effective management is using appropriate, reliable metrics for measuring success and failure. The Ministry of Justice’s recommendations to monitor prisons’ drug policy outcomes via drug testing prisoners on arrival and exit from prison will not provide reliable or useful data. Instead, a system should be implemented to monitor the nature and scale of the drug market and drug-related harms. Regular anonymous audits of drug use and the drug market could provide valuable information from treatment staff, prison officers, current and ex-prisoners. Overhaul monitoring of drug supply and security – Current supply-reduction and security measures are not grounded in evidence. New proposed measures focus on drones and visitors when there is no evidence that these are the primary sources of supply. There is evidence suggesting corrupt staff may be a major source of supply. Evidence gathering is needed on drug seizures to assist in determining their providence, as well as a new regional task force within the Prison Service to oversee periodic spot checks and searches of staff. Improve staff to prisoner ratio – Overseeing busy prison routines and effective treatment is a labour-intensive endeavour with no quick-fix technological solutions. In order to bring about this reform we need a better staff to prisoner ratio. To do so means that we need to either substantially reduce the prison population or substantially increase prison funding. Reducing the prison population likely has both fiscal and outcome benefits by reducing the use of a costly and ineffective intervention. Details: London: Volteface, 2016. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 11, 2017 at: http://volteface.me/app/uploads/2017/01/High-Stakes-A4-Printed-Booklet-Final-Version-1.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://volteface.me/app/uploads/2017/01/High-Stakes-A4-Printed-Booklet-Final-Version-1.pdf Shelf Number: 144834 Keywords: Drug Abuse and AddictionDrug ControlDrug Control PolicyDrug OffendersDrug Use in PrisonPrison ContrabandPrison PolicyPrison Violence |
Author: Independent Commission Against Corruption Title: Investigation into the Smuggling of Contraband into the Metropolitan Special Programs Centre at the Long Bay Correctional Complex Summary: This investigation by the Independent Commission Against Corruption ("the Commission") concerned the trafficking of contraband items into the Metropolitan Special Programs Centre (MSPC) at the Long Bay Correctional Complex. Karaha Pene Te-Hira, an activities officer employed by Corrective Services NSW (CSNSW) at the MSPC, admitted that, over a six-month period in 2012, he trafficked contraband, including food, clothing, shoes, mail, mobile telephones, chargers, SIM cards, steroids and a plunger for steroid injection, for two MSPC inmates in return for payment. The smuggling of contraband into correctional centres was previously dealt with in the Commission’s July 2010 report on an investigation involving the John Morony Correctional Centre. The question of how and why the same kind of conduct had recurred, despite the corruption prevention recommendations made by the Commission on that occasion having been implemented to some degree, was also explored in this investigation. This investigation examined the steps that had been taken by CSNSW to date and made recommendations about further measures to be adopted by CSNSW in the future. Results The Commission found that the following persons engaged in corrupt conduct: 1. Mr Te-Hira by i. trafficking contraband, including food, clothing, shoes, mail, mobile telephones, chargers, SIM cards, steroids and a plunger for steroid injection, into the MSPC for an inmate named Omar Zahed and another inmate identified during the inquiry as Prisoner X over a six-month period in 2012 1 Independent Commission Against Corruption, Investigation into the smuggling of contraband into the John Morony Correctional Centre, July 2010. ii. trafficking a pair of shoes into the MSPC, which he delivered to Mr Zahed on or around 14 June 2012, in return for cash and a pair of shoes iii. trafficking a pair of shoes into the MSPC, which he delivered to Mr Zahed on or around 28 June 2012, in return for a pair of shoes iv. accepting a benefit of at least $500 towards the cost of a car stereo and DVD system installed in his vehicle by Xtreme Car Audio on 23 June 2012, which he knew came from either an inmate named Alfred Fonua or another inmate, on the understanding that he would exercise his official functions in favour of Mr Fonua or Mr Zahed or another inmate associated with Mr Fonua or Mr Zahed. 2. Mr Zahed by arranging for his sister, Asmahen Zahed, to provide Mr Te-Hira with shoes for delivery to himself in the MSPC and to reward Mr Te-Hira with shoes and cash in return. 3. Ms Zahed by providing a pair of shoes and cash on 13 June 2012 and a pair of shoes on 27 June 2012 to Mr Te-Hira in return for his delivering shoes to Mr Zahed in the MSPC. These findings are set out in chapter 2 of this report. The Commission also found that Mr Te-Hira engaged in corrupt conduct by: • trafficking one pair of shoes, tweezers and a shaving razor into the MSPC, which he delivered to Prisoner X in April 2012, in return for a cash payment exceeding $50 • trafficking unspecified contraband items into the MSPC, which he delivered to Prisoner X in June 2012 trafficking two HTC mobile telephones into the MSPC, which he delivered to Prisoner X sometime after 28 June 2012. These findings are set out in chapter 3 of this report. Chapters 2 and 3 of the report also contain statements pursuant to section 74A(2) of the Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 1988 ("the ICAC Act") that the Commission is of the opinion that the advice of the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) should be obtained with respect to the prosecution of Mr Te-Hira for offences of corruptly receiving a reward contrary to section 249B(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 ("the Crimes Act"). The Commission is also of the opinion that CSNSW should give consideration to taking disciplinary action against Mr Te-Hira with a view to his dismissal. Chapter 4 sets out the Commission's corruption prevention response to the conduct disclosed during the investigation. The Commission has made the following recommendations to CSNSW. Details: Sydney: The Commission, 2013. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 22, 2017 at: https://www.icac.nsw.gov.au/documents/investigations/reports/4050-investigation-into-the-smuggling-of-contraband-into-the-metropolitan-special-programs-centre-at-the-long-bay-correctional-complex-operation-drake-january-2013/file Year: 2013 Country: Australia URL: https://www.icac.nsw.gov.au/documents/investigations/reports/4050-investigation-into-the-smuggling-of-contraband-into-the-metropolitan-special-programs-centre-at-the-long-bay-correctional-complex-operation-drake-january-2013/ Shelf Number: 114188 Keywords: Prison Contraband |
Author: Independent Commission Against Corruption Title: Investigation into the Smuggling of Contraband into the John Morony Correctional Centre Summary: This investigation by the Independent Commission Against Corruption ("the Commission") concerned the conduct of Sebastian Wade, a Senior Corrections Officer with Corrective Services NSW (CSNSW). The investigation was primarily concerned with Mr Wade supplying contraband, including drugs, to inmates at the John Morony Correctional Centre (JMCC) in return for payment. As a result of its investigation, the Commission established that on at least four occasions between mid- 2009 and January 2010 Mr Wade obtained contraband from associates of two inmates and gave them to the inmates in return for payment. His attempt to smuggle contraband into JMCC on another occasion for a third inmate was aborted when he was apprehended and arrested by NSW Police. The investigation also examined the steps taken by CSNSW to prevent the recurrence of conduct of the kind undertaken by Mr Wade as well as the steps that should be taken in the future. Results Findings that Mr Wade engaged in corrupt conduct in relation to supplying contraband to inmates are set out in chapter 2 of the report. Chapter 2 of the report contains a statement pursuant to section 74A(2) of the Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 1988 (“the ICAC Act”) that the Commission is of the opinion that the advice of the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) should be obtained with respect to the prosecution of Mr Wade for offences of receiving corrupt payments from associates of three inmates contrary to section 249B of the Crimes Act 1900 and offences of giving false or misleading evidence to the Commission contrary to section 87(1) of the ICAC Act. The Commission is also of the opinion that CSNSW should give consideration to taking disciplinary action against Mr Wade with a view to his dismissal. Chapter 3 sets out the Commissions' corruption prevention response to the conduct disclosed during the investigation. Details: Sydney: The Commission, 2010. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 22, 2017 at: https://www.icac.nsw.gov.au/docman/investigations/reports/3655-investigation-into-the-smuggling-of-contraband-into-the-john-morony-correctional-centre-operation-cicero/file Year: 2010 Country: Australia URL: https://www.icac.nsw.gov.au/docman/investigations/reports/3655-investigation-into-the-smuggling-of-contraband-into-the-john-morony-correctional-centre-operation-cicero/file Shelf Number: 147428 Keywords: Prison Contraband |
Author: Koslover, Rebecca Title: A Market Survey on Contraband Detection Technologies Summary: Contraband is a significant problem for correctional facilities across the United States (Kopochinski, 2012). Loosely defined as anything inmates are prohibited from possessing, contraband poses a threat to the safety of individuals both inside and outside the correctional system. While weapons, tools, and narcotics are the most obvious risks within the community, items such as money, electronic devices, food, and tobacco products all pose both a prevalent threat and unique detection challenge. Due to the system wide contraband problem, the National Institutes of Justice (NIJ) requested the execution of a market survey regarding commercial contraband detection technologies currently available. This document is the collective summary of that market survey. Organized into three primary sections (person-borne, vehicle-borne, and environmental), each contraband detection system's information is grouped and summarized to aid correctional officials in planning the potential acquisition and implementation of these technologies. Additionally, this document provides a summary of the background research and methods used for performing this survey. This survey does not evaluate or rank these products; there are no opinions presented concerning the quality or effectiveness of these products. Instead, the intent of this document is to provide correctional officials with a broad overview of the current contraband detection technologies available for their use. The data presented in this document was collected via multiple research and collection avenues. In addition to general Internet searches, the public was broadly solicited with a request for information (RFI) published as a Federal Register Notice (FRN). Furthermore, in order to maximize exposure, vendors identified via Internet searches were directly contacted and invited to respond to the FRN. For vendors that did not respond to the FRN, we obtained as much information as we could from their websites. Over 100 products are summarized in this survey. This document represents an overview of the technologies available at the time of the market survey (i.e., 2016). When considering the acquisition of contraband detection equipment, additional up-to-date information should be requested from the specific vendors of interest. Details: Final report to the U.S. National Institute of Justice, 2017. 402p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 6, 2017 at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/250685.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/250685.pdf Shelf Number: 145936 Keywords: Correctional AdministrationDetection TechnologyPrison ContrabandPrison ManagementPrison Security |
Author: Fitzharris, Andy Title: Chief Inspector's Report into the "Circumstances surrounding organised prisoner (Fight Club) and access to cell phones and contraband at Mount Eden Corrections Facility (MECF) Summary: Mount Eden Corrections Facility (MECF) is one of two prisons in New Zealand managed by private operators Serco New Zealand Ltd (Serco). Since August 2011, MECF has been the largest remand facility in the country, and is designed to hold up to 976 males of remand accused, remand convicted and sentenced status. On 15 July 2015 the Department of Corrections (Corrections) became aware that a series of video clips showing organised fighting between prisoners at MECF had been uploaded to the website YouTube. The videos (the YouTube Footage) provide irrefutable evidence of the existence of a 'fight club' operating at MECF. On 17 July 2015 TV3 News screened footage that had been uploaded to YouTube, showing a number of prisoners involved in organised fighting at MECF. Over the following days a number of prisoners, ex-prisoners and their families, came forth with accounts of organised fighting, prisoner on prisoner violence and inhumane treatment during their time at MECF. The videos uploaded to YouTube had been filmed on contraband cell phones, which raised concerns over prisoner access to cell phones and other contraband on to the site. An internal investigation is being completed by Serco, which holds the Prison Management Contract for MECF (the Contract). As at the date of this report (Report), Serco's internal report is yet to be provided to Corrections. By Terms of Reference dated 27 August 2015 (the Terms of Reference). I was instructed by the Chief Executive of Corrections (the Chief Executive) to conduct a full investigation (the Investigation) into: a) the possible existence of a 'fight club' at MECF; and b) access of prisoners to contraband, in particular cell phones, at MECF. The Terms of Reference superseded an earlier terms of reference dated 19 July 2015 (the Earlier Terms of Reference), which instructed me to pay particular attention to the three months prior to that date. Therefore, the Investigation has a particular focus on, but is not limited to, the three months to the date of the Earlier Terms of Reference. The Corrections Inspectorate (Inspectorate) operates under the Corrections Act 2004, the Corrections Regulations 2005, the mandate of the Chief Executive, and the policies established by the Department relating to the fair, safe, secure and humane treatment of prisoners and those detained within the corrections system. This Report contains Phase One of the Investigation required by the Terms of Reference. Phase Two will consist of a review of the adequacy of controls designed to address prisoner violence and access to cell phones operating in other New Zealand prisons, and an investigation into any reported incidents of prisoner on prisoner fighting recorded on cell phones in other New Zealand prisons. Details: Wellington, NZ: Department of Corrections, 2016. 110p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 9, 2017 at: http://www.corrections.govt.nz/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/856650/Phase_One_MECF_Report_FINAL_REDACTED.pdf Year: 2016 Country: New Zealand URL: http://www.corrections.govt.nz/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/856650/Phase_One_MECF_Report_FINAL_REDACTED.pdf Shelf Number: 147624 Keywords: Prison AdministrationPrison ContrabandPrison ViolencePrisoner MisconductPrivate Prisons |
Author: Fitzharris, Andy Title: Chief Inspector's Phase Two Report into: Circumstances surrounding organised prisoner on prisoner fighting (Fight Club) and access to cell phone contraband in New Zealand prisons other than Mount Eden Corrections Facility (MECF) Summary: We analysed a total of 655 PPV incidents for the four month period 1 April 2015 to 31 July 2015 and there was no evidence that organised prisoner fighting was happening at any of the eight Corrections Services prisons we visited. There were four incidents involving prisoner sparring and conditioning reported by two prisons and these could be considered as a forerunner of organised prisoner fighting. On each occasion they were quickly identified and staff responded promptly to prevent them escalating. We recognise that there will always be elements of assaults and fighting by prisoners, and it's not always easy to prevent violent incidents from happening, even when staff are observing prisoners first hand. There were good levels of prisoner supervision apparent at each prison and recurring evidence from incident reports and interviews that staff responses are timely as soon as they became aware of situations that required their intervention. Active management of prisoners and prompt action taken by staff clearly presents as the most effective preventive control to mitigate risks of PPV situations developing into more serious incidents. There are a range of Violence Reduction Strategies in various stages of implementation across each prison. Most have been established since the 'fight club' events surfaced at MECF and present as good practice in terms of controls for PPV. We noted that prisoner access to physical training equipment has been restricted as a control at some prisons to limit options for conditioning. The extent of these restrictions needs to be balanced against reasonable access to exercise equipment for prisoner well-being. Prisoners are entitled to have access to exercise equipment however their fitness activities should be closely supervised to ensure conditioning and sparring is not happening. We were frustrated with the poor quality of incident reporting in IOMS relating to PPV and contraband cell phones. The incident reporting system is cumbersome and component categories require review to be made more user-friendly. In some cases, PPV incidents are being reported under the non-notifiable category of 'Fighting' rather than 'Assault, non-serious or Assault, no injury'. We could not confirm how widespread this practice was and suggest Corrections Services conduct a further review of incident reporting categories to determine and clarify business requirements. The capability for prison management to effectively implement gang management strategies may be compromised by inaccurate data in IOMS about individual prisoner gang membership/affiliations. This data needs to be cleaned up so that gang information on IOMS is current and reliable. Details: Wellington, NZ: Department of Corrections, 2016. 39p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 20, 2017 at: http://www.corrections.govt.nz/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/856652/Phase_Two_Report_FINAL_REDACTED.pdf Year: 2016 Country: New Zealand URL: http://www.corrections.govt.nz/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/856652/Phase_Two_Report_FINAL_REDACTED.pdf Shelf Number: 148278 Keywords: Prison AdministrationPrison ContrabandPrison GangsPrison ViolencePrisoner MisconductPrivate Prisons |
Author: Blakey, David Title: Disrupting the supply of illicit drugs into prisons. A report for the Director General of. National Offender Management Service Summary: This is a one person review of how illicit drugs get into prisons and what can be done about it. Drugs get in: - With visitors - 'Over the wall' - In the post and parcels - Brought in by prisoners - Through corrupt staff - Disrupting one route raises the use of the others; - Rehabilitation and detoxification schemes are undermined by illicit drugs; - Prison drug strategies should cover both disruption and rehabilitation, and be managed by a nominated Governor. Five factors affect all or more than one route and can be employed to disrupt. They are: - Use of good practice - Disrupting the use of mobile phones - Use of searching - Use of search dogs - Use of legislation In the long term there are 3 major ways to disrupt effectively. They are: - Development and use of technology - Development of partnership working with Police - Use of intelligence Details: s.l.: David Blakey, 2008. 39p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 12, 2018 at: http://www.onlinelibraryaddictions.stir.ac.uk/files/2017/07/blakey-report-disrupting.pdf Year: 2008 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.onlinelibraryaddictions.stir.ac.uk/files/2017/07/blakey-report-disrupting.pdf Shelf Number: 150842 Keywords: Drug OffendersDrugs in PrisonIllicit DrugsPrison Contraband |
Author: Cruz-Rivera, Luis Jose Title: Preventing Contraband Cellular Phone Use in Prisons: A Technical Response to NTIA Summary: Overview From correctional facilities within the United States (U.S) and throughout the world to homeland defense and scenarios taking place on battlefields, illicit cellular phone use and unauthorized mobile data systems access is impacting mission safety at many levels. As evidenced by recent congressional activities and the National Telecommunications and Information Administration's (NTIA) Notice of Inquiry (NOI) regarding technical solutions to detect and prevent illegal use of cellular phones in correctional facilities, this problem is a growing threat to the security of our nation and its citizens. Too often, solution are designed to control threats, such as the growing cellular contraband problem and other major safety concerns, focus on the technology component , and fails to consider the appropriate combination of skills, processes, and technologies to enable a comprehensive solution. In the case of contraband of cell phone use within correctional facilities, the solution lays in the architecture, addressing and combating the root cause of the problem. The effective use of technology can combine intelligence gathering with analysis to support the security mission. Effective operating scenario knowledge, decision-making capabilities, and goal attainment need to ultimately control and deny this contraband issue. Commercial off the shelf (COTS) standalone systems do not offer a complete and satisfactory solution to the contraband cell phone challenge detailed in the NTIA request. Consideration of unified operational requirements, concepts of operations and functional requirements must be applied to the selection of available systems or development of an effective system of systems appropriate to address the mission space. This facilitates the deployment of an intelligent architecture for centralized and regional environments alike with a comprehensive affordable solution. The commercial market space has recognized this disparity and as the NTIA NOI identifies several point solutions or technologies have been developed within the current regulatory environment to address the known cellular contraband issues. For the purposes of this paper these solutions fall into two general categories - active radio-frequency (RF) systems and passive RF systems. While there are hybrid scenarios (a solution using both active and passive RF), this document will focus only on the solutions that fall into the active RF category and the passive RF category; hybrid solutions are excluded from this analysis. Furthermore, this document intends to elucidate a comprehensive approach for managing the operational data needs of several layers of the U.S. Government and other key stakeholders affected by illicit use of cellular phones in prisons. This document will discuss the two solution types and provide details regarding several technology and deployment considerations to address the architecture of the solution. Figure 1 depicts the two mission areas in which all of the possible solutions fall - contraband-based solutions and intelligence-based solutions. The contraband-based solution addresses the short-term need for denial by jamming or detection and monitoring for manual control. The intelligence-based solution provides varying capabilities of C3I (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) interface and allows stakeholder operations to address criminal or other activities of interest within stakeholder jurisdictions. This capability can bridge other additional security needs to the solution, thus enabling the correctional community to utilize data sharing with law enforcement and judicial stakeholders to maintain a holistic view of criminal network communications and contraband management activities within the target locations. The level of metadata attainable in these transactions provides a large data-mining capability, which can interface with other operating scenario data sources and provide a new appreciation for connection networks. Within the scope considered by NTIA, solutions to this problem will serve the following primary stakeholders: - Prisons and correctional institutions that want the technology to solve the problem - Commercial operators who have paid millions and in some cases billions of dollars for spectrum and equipment and do not want their coverage of valid users impacted - The general public who wants a solution to stop the criminal activities but without impact to their use of devices on the outside of the correctional institution location Other stakeholders include: - State and local law enforcement agencies requiring increased insight and awareness of activities linked with illicit communications - Department of Homeland Security (DHS) data fusion centers, Department of Justice (DOJ), National Institute of Justice (NIJ), Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and other law enforcement (LE) entities - Government and industry associations responsible for overseeing the use of spectrum and wireless technology that want a solution that can operate within the boundaries of the law and regulations The opportunity to solve this problem using technology addresses a broad market segment, which also needs to coexist with other security efforts and data-sharing initiatives among the stakeholders. Strategic acquisition and integration work will be critical to deploying a given solution in order to avoid reengineering of design due to technology fluctuations, obsolescence, and total cost of ownership. If a rigorous solution development process is not followed, correctional institutions run the risk of committing and expending unnecessary resources and funds resulting to system implementation defects, technical capability gaps, and system suitability inadequacies within a constantly changing wireless environment. Details: Fairfax, VA: ManTech International Corporation, 2010. 17p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 16, 2019 at: https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/mantech_response_to_ntia_inquiry_v1.01.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/mantech_response_to_ntia_inquiry_v1.01.pdf Shelf Number: 154226 Keywords: Cell PhonesContrabandCorrectional FacilitiesIllicit Cellular Phone UseMobile Data Systems AccessPrison ContrabandPrisoner Misconduct |